Abstract. We give an analysis of various classical axioms and characterize a notion of minimal classical logic that enforces Peirce's law without enforcing Ex Falso Quodlibet. We show that a "natural" implementation of this logic is Parigot's classical natural deduction. We then move on to the computational side and emphasize that Parigot's λµ corresponds to minimal classical logic. A continuation constant must be added to λµ to get full classical logic. The extended calculus is isomorphic to a syntactical restriction of Felleisen's theory of control that offers a more expressive reduction semantics. This isomorphic calculus is in correspondence with a refined version of Prawitz's natural deduction.
Introduction
Traditionally, classical logic is defined by extending intuitionistic logic with either Peirce's law, the excluded middle law, or the double negation law. We show that these laws are not equivalent and define minimal classical logic, which validates Peirce's law but not Ex Falso Quodlibet. This logic is interesting from a computational point of view since it corresponds to a calculus with a notion of control (such as callcc or µ) which however does not permit aborting of computations. Indeed our analysis reveals that closed typed terms of Parigot's λµ (1992 Parigot's λµ ( , 1993a correspond to tautologies of minimal classical logic and not of (full) classical logic. To prove tautologies of classical natural deduction, the λµ calculus must be extended with a continuation called tp which denotes the top-level.
On the programming side, the presence of the continuation tp makes it possible to distinguish between aborting a computation and throwing to a continuation (as aborting corresponds to throwing to the special top-level continuation). This distinction can be used to develop more refined programming calculi for languages with control operators. In particular, in the seminal theory of control λ C (Felleisen and Hieb, 1992) , there is a mismatch between the operational and prooftheoretical interpretation of the reduction theory. This mismatch is resolved by moving to a richer theory with a continuation constant.
We start in Section 2 with reviewing the definitions of minimal, intuitionistic and classical logic. We present both the axiomatic and structural rendering of these logics. We introduce an equivalent formulation of Prawitz's natural deduction which better corresponds to the axiomatic presentation. We conclude the section with the more recent formulation of Parigot's classical natural deduction which employs sequents with multiple conclusions. In Section 3, we introduce the new notion of minimal classical logic. We first analyze which axioms lead to this new logic. Next, we give the structural presentation. Section 4 reviews the basic control operators and calculi together with their (Curry-Howard) isomorphism to classical logic discovered by Griffin (1990) . Section 5 and 6 introduce two isomorphic calculi which are the computational counterparts of classical natural deduction with one and multiple conclusions, respectively. We discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8. Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to propositional logic.
Minimal, Intuitionistic and Classical Logic
We successively recall the definitions of minimal, intuitionistic and classical logic, and state simple facts about them. We use natural deduction to formalize the various logics. If we are only interested in provability, contexts could have been defined just as sets of formulas (not as sets of named formulas). But in order to be able to assign λ-terms to proofs, we need to distinguish between different occurrences of the same formula. This is the role of names. Otherwise, the two distinct normal proofs of A, A A (representable by the λ-terms λx.λy.x and λx.λy.y) are identified.
We first consider sequents of the form Γ A, where the formulas in Γ are the hypotheses and the formula on the right-hand side of the symbol is the conclusion. If S is a schematic axiom or rule, we denote by S, Γ A the fact that Γ A is derivable using an arbitrary number of instances of S. We will sometimes omit irrelevant hypothesis to make proofs more readable.
Minimal Logic
Minimal natural deduction is an implementation of minimal logic (Johansson, 1937) . It is defined by the set of (schematic) inference rules given in Figure 1 (the names of formulas are left implicit and omitted).
Minimal logic originally included negation but no formula ⊥. Negation in minimal logic is quite formal in the sense that A → ¬A → B does not hold in general. It can actually be shown that ¬A in the original minimal logic behaves exactly the same as A → A 0 , where A 0 is some globally distinguished formula. We here transfer to minimal logic the standard decomposition of ¬A as A → ⊥ from intuitionistic or classical logic, hence taking A 0 ∆ = ⊥, but throwing away any specific rules about ⊥. Thus, the formula ⊥, despite a name suggesting it denotes the absurd formula, could essentially be interpreted by any formula, even a true one. This in turn shows that minimal logic can alternatively be seen as the positive fragment (i.e., the fragment without negation) of intuitionistic logic.
Valuations and normal proofs are important tools for reasoning about provability in propositional logic. When reasoning with valuations requires proving completeness results we opt for reasoning with normal proofs. We say that an occurrence of → e (also called Modus Ponens) is normal if its left premise is an axiom or another normal final-for-pdf.tex; 15/05/2012; 4:49; p.3 hal-00697242, version 1 -15 May 2012 Figure 2 . Intuitionistic logic instance of Modus Ponens. We say that a proof in minimal logic is normal if any occurrence of Modus Ponens in the proof is normal. It is known that a provable statement can be proved with a normal proof.
For all the systems we present, the following weakening lemma will hold. LEMMA 2. Let Γ A be derivable, then for every Γ such that Γ ⊆ Γ , Γ A is derivable.
Intuitionistic Logic
Any formula is implied by ⊥ in intuitionistic logic. A way to express this in natural deduction is to consider ⊥ as a connective with no introduction rule and a single elimination rule as shown in Figure 2 . Obviously, this presentation of intuitionistic logic is equivalent to minimal logic extended with the following schematic axiom:
In propositional or first-order predicate logic, there is no formula ⊥ with the desired property, as stated by the following lemma which expresses that (propositional) intuitionistic logic is strictly stronger than minimal logic.
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Proof. Follows from the soundness of minimal logic with respect to classical valuations V by taking V(⊥) = 1 (van Dalen, 1997) .
Note that the proof more generally shows that there is no possible interpretation of ⊥ in minimal logic that makes EFQ provable. In contrast, in minimal second-order logic, a formula having the property of ⊥ is ∀X.X. The result actually also extends to classical logic (as soon as ⊥ is not inter ... Remark 1. Negation can be defined directly with the following inference rules with no reference to ⊥:
The rule ¬ i is derivable in minimal logic whereas ¬ e uses ⊥ e . In the following we also use the abbreviation:
Assuming the set of formulas is enriched with disjunction and the following inference rules:
is provable in intuitionistic logic but not in minimal logic. The converse is only provable in weak classical logic, which is given next. Normalization still holds with the addition of disjunction.
Axiomatic Presentation of Classical Logic
Traditionally classical logic is obtained by adding any of the schematic axioms given in Figure 3 to intuitionistic logic (Lalement, 1993 Weak classical: 2. PL ⊥ and EM are equivalent (as schemes).
3. GEM and PL are equivalent (as schemes).
4. GEM and PL imply EM and PL ⊥ but not conversely.
5. DN implies GEM and PL but not conversely.
6. DN, EM+EFQ, PL ⊥ +EFQ, GEM+EFQ, and PL+EFQ are all equivalent.
Proof. We only show the proofs of 5 and 6.
5. We first show that DN implies EFQ:
DN implies PL (we make use of DN and EFQ as rules intead of axioms):
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As in Proposition 4, the converse direction follows from the soundness of minimal logic.
6. PL ⊥ and EFQ imply DN:
Structural Presentation of Classical Logic
We present two implementations of classical logic: we start with an alternative of Prawitz's classical logic (1965) and then present Parigot's Classical Natural Deduction (1992 
The proof uses EFQ. However, this seems counter-intuitive since PL is weaker than DN, and therefore the proof should not need the full power of EFQ. We address this discrepancy by providing a restricted version of EFQ that can be used to prove PL from PL ⊥ but not DN. This is done by defining a new ⊥ e rule as follows:
and by introducing the Weakening rule defined as follows:
The new symbol ⊥ ⊥ stands for a sequent with no conclusions, that is, instead of writing Γ we write Γ ⊥ ⊥. As we explain in Section 5, the symbol ⊥ ⊥ has an interesting computational justification. In Figure 4 we present Prawitz's revision. Formulae do not contain ⊥ ⊥, thus for example the sequent Γ A →⊥ ⊥ is not syntactically correct. However, ⊥ ⊥ can occur in the context Γ in the form of A →⊥ ⊥. Other than the ⊥ e rule, ⊥ ⊥ is introduced by the ⊥ ⊥ i rule. This rule is not subsumed by the implication elimination, as suggested below: Figure 4 . Only the proof of DN uses the ⊥ e rule. The use of EFQ in the proof of PL is replaced by an application of the Weakening rule.
1.
where Γ is obtained from Γ by replacing each B →⊥ ⊥ by a subcontext ∆ of the form
⇐ Follows from the following two points: 1) PL is provable in classical logic; 2) each axiom of the form
can be replaced by
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⇒ By rule induction. The only interesting case is rule RAA ⊥ ⊥ . We distinguish two cases depending on which rule introduced ⊥ ⊥.
⊥ e ) We have:
By the induction hypothesis:
The result then follows from ⊥ e and n applications of PL r :
where P L r stands for the derived inference rule
The result then follows by n applications of PL r . For the other case, we have:
where ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 are as follows: We proceed as follows:
Parigot's Natural Deduction with Multiple Conclusions
As initially shown by Gentzen (1969) in his sequent calculus LK, classical logic can be obtained by considering sequents with several conclusions instead of adding new inference rules. Parigot (1992) extended this approach to natural deduction. We show that using sequents with several conclusions allows for a uniform presentation of different logics. Parigot's convention is to have two kinds of sequents, one with only named formulas on the right: Γ ∆ , and one with exactly one unnamed formula on the right:
To clearly mark the distinction between an unnamed formula and the set ∆ of named formulas, we write the above sequents as: Γ ; ∆ and Γ A; ∆ . are the conclusions. In each case, the intuitive meaning is that the conjunction of the hypotheses implies the disjunction of the conclusions. A sequent with no conclusion means the negation of the conjunction of the hypotheses.
The inference rules are shown in Figure 5 . The formulas explicitly mentioned in the inference rules are called active. The one bearing the connective (introduced or eliminated) is called the main formula. The notation A, ∆ stands for the union of the singleton context A and ∆ and assumes that both components are disjoint. All rules, except the Passivate rule and the ⊥ e rule, have an active formula in the conclusion. The axiom and implication rules are as in minimal logic. The goal of the Activate and Passivate rules is to allow changing focus from the main formula to any other formula in the context. For example, the sequent:
indicates that our focus is on formula A. To focus on formula B, appearing in the right-hand side context, we first need to unfocus A (using the Passivate rule):
Passivate thus obtaining a sequent with no active formula. To focus on B we use the Activate rule:
These steps are necessary to show C A → B; A, since in order to apply the implication introduction rule the formula B has to be active: 1.
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2.
The above proof uses the rule ⊥ e whereas the proof of PL does not.
Parigot's classical logic is a correct characterization of classical logic, as expressed in the following proposition. If the context ∆ is the set of formulas A 1 , · · · , A n , then we write
Minimal Classical Logic
The previous section suggests that there is space for a classical logic which does validate Peirce's law (or GEM) but not EFQ. By analogy with minimal intuitionistic logic, we call this logic minimal classical logic. As discussed in the case of minimal intuitionistic logic, minimal classical logic can be seen as the positive fragment of classical logic where the absurdity formula and negation are still there but in a degenerated form that does not allow one to prove any formula from an absurdity. More specifically, Avron (1991) notes that a standard axiomatization of classical positive logic is provided by the following axioms:
plus the Modus Ponens inference rule. Indeed, this axiomatization is equivalent to minimal logic plus Pierce Law (Goubault-Larrecq and Mackie, 2001). Since ⊥ in minimal classical logic is a distinguished formula without any special properties, EM and PL ⊥ , without EFQ, are weaker than PL and their addition to minimal logic seems uninteresting.
The minimal subset of the revised version of Prawitz's classical logic (see Figure 4) is obtained by disallowing the ⊥ e rule and is denoted by
Another implementation of minimal classical logic is Parigot's classical natural deduction (see Figure 5 ) with no special rule for ⊥. That is, without hiding the occurrences of the ⊥ formula on the right-handside of the sequents (Parigot, 1992, p. 198) . We denote this subset by
Using Proposition 5(5), we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 12. Minimal Parigot's classical natural deduction does not prove DN.
However the sequent MC ¬¬A → A; ⊥ is provable. We now define the notion of normal proof for a minimal variant of Parigot's classical natural deduction. We say that an occurrence of the rule Passivate is normal if its premise is not an Activate rule. We say that a proof in minimal classical natural deduction is normal if any occurrence of Modus Ponens in the proof is normal (this is the same definition as for minimal non-classical natural deduction) and if any occurrence of Passivate is also normal.
THEOREM 13 (Parigot (1993a) ). If Γ MC A; ∆ is provable then there is a normal proof of Γ MC A; ∆ We define normal proofs for classical natural deduction as for minimal classical natural deduction where the rule ⊥ e is normal if its premise is not an Activate rule (i.e. ⊥ e is considered at the same level as Passivate). Parigot's normalization proof for minimal classical natural deduction (Parigot, 1993b; Parigot, 1997) applies also for full classical natural deduction. THEOREM 14 (Parigot) . If Γ C A; ∆ is provable then there is a normal proof of Γ C A; ∆.
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As expected, full classical logic is conservative over minimal classical logic for formulas not mentioning the ⊥ formula, as stated by the following consequence of Theorem 14.
Proof. The "if" part is trivial. For the "only if" part, let's apply Theorem 14 to get a normal form of C A and consider the more general case of a proof of Γ MC Ξ; ∆, where Ξ stands for an optional formula and ⊥ does not occur in Γ.
We show by induction that the rule ⊥ e cannot occur in the proof. First, we observe that the only rule changing the context to the left of , namely → i , preserves the property that ⊥ does not occur in Γ. Next, we show that it is impossible that the rule ⊥ e occurs in the derivation. Assume that it were so, deriving Γ C ; ∆ from a proof π of Γ C ⊥; ∆. Since π is normal, it does not start with an Activate rule so that it starts either by an axiom rule or by a sequence of → e whose leftmost premise (by normality of π) is an axiom rule. This means that there should be an hypothesis of the form A 1 → ... → A n → ⊥ in Γ which contradicts the fact that ⊥ does not occur in the formulas of Γ.
Remark 3. Without the rule Passivate minimal classical natural deduction yields minimal logic, since the context ∆ is inert and can only remain empty in a derivation for which the end sequent has the form Γ A; (even the Activate rule cannot be applied). Similarly, classical natural deduction without the Passivate rule yields intuitionistic logic. As a consequence, minimal and intuitionistic natural deduction can both be seen as subsystems of classical natural deduction.
Control Operators and Calculi
The logical systems introduced so far can be related to programming under the so called Curry-Howard isomorphism. The isomorphism establishes a correspondence between a proof of a formula A and a program of type A. Executing a program corresponds to normalizing a proof.
Minimal logic corresponds to the simply-typed λ-calculus (Barendregt, 1992). As shown in Figure 6 , the axiom of minimal logic corresponds to looking up an environment for a variable's typing, lambda abstraction corresponds to implication introduction, and function application corresponds to implication elimination. Execution is carried out by the β-rule: Figure 6 . The λ-calculus and minimal logic where N 1 [N 2 /x] stands for the capture-free substitution of N 2 for each free occurrence of x in N 1 . A β-redex corresponds to a non normal occurrence of Modus Ponens and β-reduction eliminates these detours. Griffin (1990) was the first to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical logic. This entails extending the λ-calculus with control operators, which are reviewed next.
Control operators and their semantics
To reason about Scheme programs, Felleisen and Hieb (1992) introduced the λ C -calculus whose syntax is in Figure 7 . The calculus extends the call-by-value λ-calculus with the operators abort (A), callcc (K), and C. The operators K and C provide abortive continuations: the invocation of a continuation reinstates the captured context in place of the current one. Their semantics can be described most concisely using the following three operational rules, which rewrite complete programs:
In each of the rules, the entire program is split into an evaluation context E representing the continuation, and a current redex to rewrite. The operator A aborts the continuation returning its subexpression to the top-level; the other two operators capture the evaluation context E and reify it as a function (λx.A E[x]). When invoked, this function aborts the evaluation context at the point of invocation, and installs the captured context instead. The rules show that C differs from K in that C does not duplicate the evaluation context:
This difference makes C at least as expressive as both A and K; it can be used to define them as follows:
where refers to an anonymous variable. The operator K is not as powerful as C (Felleisen, 1990) ; expressing C using K is only possible if we also have the abort primitive A:
In the sequel we focus on C, but still occasionally treat A as a primitive control operator to provide more intuition.
Reduction Rules
Instead of presenting the semantics of control operators as a relation on complete programs, it is possible to give local reduction rules that are applicable anywhere in a term and in arbitrary order. The call-by-value and call-by-name reduction semantics of λ C are presented in Figure 8 .
It is possible to consider more rules, e.g. η, but they are not needed for expressing evaluation. The rules simulate the capture of the evaluation context using several small steps: first the control operation is lifted across one context at a time until it reaches another control operator. At any point, it is possible to use C tp to start applying M to part of the captured context and then continue lifting the outer C to accumulate more of the context. The reduction rules are however not expressive enough to compute a value, which is obtainable by applying the computation rule (i.e. only applicable at the top-level):
However, the reduction rules are powerful enough to delay the application of this rule until the end.
Remark 4. An important point to clarify is the presence of the abort operations in the right-hand sides of the reduction rules. As far as evaluation is concerned, they are not necessary. They are important in order to obtain a satisfying correspondence between the operational and reduction semantics. For example, the term 3 + C (λk.2 + k1) evaluates to 4 according to λ vC . By reducing the same term with the reduction rules without the abort operations we have:
The absence of the abort makes it impossible to eliminate the control context 2 + , at least without using some context-sensitive information about the binding of q. With the presence of the abort, the term includes specific information that q is not a normal function but is an abortive continuation which never returns to its caller. As we explain in Section 5, these abort steps are different from the abort used in defining C in terms of K. The aborts in the reduction rules correspond to throwing to a user defined continuation (i.e. a Passivate step), whereas the abort in the definition of C corresponds to throwing to the predefined top-level continuation (i.e. a ⊥ e step).
Griffin's Type System
Griffin noticed that the evaluation rule of C suggests the following type: Figure 9 . Call-by-name and call-by-value λnK B reduction rules which would lead to the following typing of A:
By reading types as propositions, the above rule would lead to an inconsistent system, since every formula would be provable. To solve the problem Griffin introduced a new type ⊥ representing the proposition false, and set B to ⊥:
In conclusion, with the addition of control operators we have a term assignment for intuitionistic and classical logic. We let λ A denote the λ-calculus extended with the constant A of type ⊥ → A.
PROPOSITION 16.
A formula A is provable in classical logic (resp. intuitionistic logic) iff there exists a closed λ C term (resp. λ A term) M such that M : A is provable. 
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To witness Peirce's law we need an alternative operator which we call K B defined as follows:
For example we write K B (λc. 1 + c 1), instead of K (λc. 1 + A (c 1)). The reduction rules for K B are given in Figure 9 . It would seem natural to also include a rule similar to C idem such as:
However, the above breaks subject reduction as the following example illustrates:
If we let λ K B be the λ-calculus extended with the constant K B with type PL we arrive at the following result. PROPOSITION 17. A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic iff there exists a closed λ K B term M such that M : A is provable.
Remark 5. Parigot (1992) criticized Griffin's work because the proposed C-typing did not fit the operational semantics. Setting the type of a continuation to be ¬A implies that the top-level has type ⊥, but there is no closed term of type ⊥, since ⊥ corresponds to the empty type. Therefore, the typing is useless. Said otherwise, with the current typing for C we lose subject reduction. For example, in the following reduction:
C (λq. q 5) + 2 → (λq. q 5)(λx. A (x + 2)) , the left-hand side has type int, whereas the right-hand side does not type check: the abort is invoked with an int type instead of a ⊥ type. To solve this conflict between ⊥ and the top-level type, Griffin proposed to consider programs of the shape C(λk.k M ), thus creating a term of type ⊥. As detailed in the next section, the classical version of Parigot's λµ requires a similar intervention; a free continuation constant is needed. It is also important to underline that Griffin's typing is preserved by the reduction semantics of Figure 8 , as was also emphasized by de Groote (1994) . The only rule that breaks subject reduction is the top-level computation rule (i.e. C M → M (λx.A (x))), which forces a conversion from ⊥ to the top-level type.
Curry-Howard Isomorphism
Summarizing the previous results we have: INTERMEZZO 18. The encodings presented above can be derived by assigning terms to proofs.
1. For example, the encoding of A in terms of C (see Abbrev. 2) is derived by assigning a term to the proof of ⊥ → A in terms of elimination of double negation:
We derive the encoding of K in terms of C by assigning a term to the proof of PL ⊥ in terms of DN(we simply write C instead of the axiom C : DN ):
3. We derive the encoding of C in terms of K by assigning a term to the proof of DN in terms of PL ⊥ and EFQ: 
We can write the above term in ML as follows:
If we compare the ML term and the PL proof assignment, we notice that one term contains an abort invocation whereas the other one contains a throw construct. This disparity was already pointed out before when we stressed that the proof of Peirce's law should not invoke EFQ or equivalently an abort statement. That disparity led to the introduction of an alternative of Prawitz's logic which still needs a term assignment. We turn to its definition in the next section, which justifies the distinction between ⊥ and ⊥ ⊥.
Computational Content of Classical Deduction with One Conclusion
We introduce a refinement of λ C called the λ C -tp -calculus which is betterbehaved as a reduction system than λ C . The set of λ C terms extends the λ-calculus terms with terms of the form C -(λk. J) where J stands for a jump, that is, a term of the form k M or tp M . The metavariable k ranges over continuation variables, which are distinct from regular variables. The continuation tp is a special constant which denotes the top-level. The translation from λ C to λ C -tp is given in Figure 11 . In the new calculus, it is possible to distinguish between capturing a Figure 10 . λ C -tp and classical logic with one conclusion
Figure 11. Embedding of λC into λ C -tp continuation and expressing where to go next. The embedding of C explicitly expresses the jump to the top-level, and the embedding of K explicitly expresses that control goes back to the current context. These things are left implicit in λ C . To summarize, aborting a computation (i.e. , throwing to the toplevel continuation) is written as:
and throwing to a user-defined continuation is written as:
Type System
We adopt two types of judgments: Γ M : A and Γ J :⊥ ⊥. Since the invocation of a continuation leaves the current context, it intuitively corresponds to a sequent with no conclusion. Instead of typing a continuation as A → ⊥ we use the type A →⊥ ⊥, thus distinguishing the top-level type from the result type of a continuation. However, we still need a conversion from ⊥ ⊥ to any other type in order to write terms such as 1+k 1 where k is a continuation. This conversion is done by the Weakening rule. The invocation of a continuation simply corresponds to a ⊥ ⊥ introduction. If the argument has type ⊥, which is the top-level type, the special continuation denoting the top-level is called. We have:
As expected, only the term witnessing DN refers to the top-level continuation. We call λ C -the subset of λ C -tp which does not allow terms of the form C -(λk.tp M ).
PROPOSITION 19.
A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic (resp. classical logic) with one conclusion iff there exists a closed λ Cterm (resp. λ C -tp term) M such that M : A is provable.
By Propositions 10, 17 and 19, λ C -is equivalent to λ K B . However, it might not be at all obvious how in λ K B to use a continuation in different contexts, since we do not have weakening available. Consider for example the following λ C -term:
We use the continuation in both boolean and integer contexts. How can we write the above expression without making use of weakening or throw? The proof of Proposition 7 gives the answer:
We call λ A -the subset of λ C -which only allows jumps to the toplevel, that is, it corresponds to the λ-calculus extended with terms of the form C -(λ .tp M ). PROPOSITION 20. A formula A is provable in intuitionistic logic iff there exists a closed λ A -term M such that M : A is provable.
Reduction Semantics
The call-by-name and call-by-value λ C -tp reduction rules are given in Figure 12 . The rule C top , whose action is to wrap an application of a continuation with a throw operation, is not needed. The rule Cidem' is a special case of C idem where the continuation k is tp. The rule Cidem is similar to the rule proposed by Barbanera and Berardi (1993) :
Figure 12. Call-by-name and call-by-value λ C -and λ C -tp reduction rules where M has type ¬A. Felleisen and Hieb (1992) proposed the following additional rules for λ vC :
(where E stands for a call-by-value evaluation context) and
where k is not free in M . The first rule, which is a generalization of C L , C R , and C tp , adds expressive power to the calculus. The second rule, which is also used by Hofmann (1995) , leads to better simulation of evaluation. However, both rules destroy confluence of λ vC as the following example illustrates.
EXAMPLE 21. In the following diagram if M does not reduce to a value then the two reduction sequences in the extended λ vC cannot be brought together. of reduction theories. Since C elim is already present in our calculi and C E is derivable, one may consider our calculi as a solution.
PROPOSITION 22.
1. λ vC -tp and λ nC -tp are confluent and strongly normalizing.
2. Subject reduction: Given λ vC -tp (λ nC -tp ) terms M, N , if Γ M : A and M → →N then Γ N : A. Proof. As shown in the next section, the λ nC -tp calculus corresponds to Parigot's call-by-name λµ calculus, which is confluent and strongly normalizable (Py, 1998; Parigot, 1993b; Parigot, 1997) . The λ vC -tp calculus corresponds to a subset of the λµ v calculus of Ong and Stewart (1997) which is strongly normalizing. Confluence follows from the fact that all critical pairs converge.
Soundness and completeness properties for λ vC -tp with respect to λ vC are stated in terms of observational equivalence. Given a reduction relation X, and two terms M and N , possibly containing free variables, we say M X N if for every context P which binds all the free variables of M and
for some values V 1 and V 2 . For example, any two terms that are convertible using the reduction relation are observationally equivalent. Two non-convertible terms may still be equivalent if no sequence of reductions in any context can invalidate their equivalence. An example of this kind is the equivalence (λx.x) (y z) λ C (y z). The embedding of λ vC -tp into λ vC essentially removes occurrences of the top-level continuation, which is implicit in λ vC :
(C -(λk.J))
The above proposition replaces Proposition 11 from the conference version (Ariola and Herbelin, 2003) which claimed a stronger (but incorrect) result. The proof of the first clause reduces to checking that embedding both sides of every λ vC -reduction produces semanticallyequivalent terms in λ vC -tp . For some of the cases, embedded terms are related by a corresponding reduction in λ vC -tp and hence are obviously semantically-equivalent. For the C idem case, the embedded left-hand side does not reduce to the embedded right-hand side, but both can reduce final-for-pdf.tex; 15/05/2012; 4:49; p.26 hal-00697242, version 1 -15 May 2012 to a common term, and hence are again semantically-equivalent. The left-hand side and right-hand side of the C tp rule map into convertible terms. The lifting rules C L are C R introduce a complication: proving the equivalence of the embedded terms requires using the following equivalence:
even when M is not a value. This happens because in contrast to the regular substitution operation, structural substitutions can replace arbitrary jumps (k M ) by (k (V M )) even when M is not a value.
The proof of the second clause reduces to proving:
The proof of the first statement is almost straightforward: proving that C M is equivalent to (C M ) •• requires using C tp which is not a reduction rule but otherwise a valid observational equivalence.
When attempting to prove the second statement, we encounter a problem related to free continuation variables. Even though programs are closed terms, reductions can happen anywhere including under binders and hence it is possible for a λ vC -tp -reduction to manipulate an open term. In particular, consider Cidem where the continuation variable k is free. The right-hand side maps to the λ vC -term C(λk. J[k /q]
• ) but for the left-hand side we have:
which is equivalent to the λ vC -term C(λk.J • [λx. A (k x)/q]). Since the variable k is not special in λ vC it could, as far as the λ vC -theory is concerned, be substituted with an arbitrary procedure and hence it is definitely not the case that one can assume that k and (λx.A (k x)) are observationally equivalent. This assumption would be correct if we could somehow guarantee that k is substituted by a continuation. In a complete program, this is clearly the case as the left-hand side must occur in a context . . . C -(λk . . . . . . .) . . . which binds k to a continuation variable. We just need to make this information explicit in the statement of the Proposition (Sabry and Felleisen, 1993, Lemma 19): 2'. Let M → N be a λ vC -tp -reduction, and let k 1 , . . . , k n be the free continuation variables in M , then we have the equivalence
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The proof of the modified clause proceeds by cases. For the reduction Celim we use the fact that even though C elim is not a reduction of λ vC , it is a valid equivalence. The reductions C -L and C -R require the following equivalences in λ vC where k is a continuation variable and M may not be a value:
These again allow one to jump with a non-value. All the required λ vC equivalences are known to be valid (Kameyama and Hasegawa, 2003; Sabry and Felleisen, 1993) .
Remark 6. Reducing the term corresponding to C(λk. k I x) 1 we have:
This reduction sequence is better than the corresponding sequence in λ vC . However, the rules are still not complete with respect to evaluation. In particular, it is not possible to simulate the computation rules:
For example, the reduction rules cannot reduce the following program:
to λx.A -(λy. N ). To do that the calculus must be extended with a control delimiter (Ariola et al., 2004) . Figure 13 describes the λµ calculus of Parigot (1992) We use λµtp to denote the whole calculus with ⊥ e and λµ to denote the calculus without ⊥ e . The need for an extra continuation constant to interpret the elimination of ⊥ can be emphasized by the following statement.
Computational Content of Classical Natural Deduction with Multiple Conclusions
PROPOSITION 24. A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic (resp. classical logic) iff there exists a closed λµ term (resp. λµtp term) t such that t : A is provable. Figure 14 . Call-by-name and call-by-value λµ and λµtp reduction rules
We write λµ n and λµ v (resp. λµ n tp and λµ v tp) for the λµ calculus (resp. λµtp calculus) equipped with call-by-name and call-by-value reduction rules, respectively. The reduction rules are given in Figure 14 (Parigot, 1992) ). The rules are the same for the λµ and λµtp calculi. The calculus λµ n is Parigot's original calculus, while our presentation of λµ v is similar to the presentation of Ong and Stewart (1997) . Both sets of reduction rules are well-typed and satisfy subject reduction.
6.1. Relation between the λµtp and the λ C -tp calculi
The λµtp calculi and the λ C -tp calculi are in one-to-one correspondence:
This correspondence extends to the reduction rules ( Figure 12 matches Figure 14) , as expressed by the following statement.
LEMMA 25. Let t, s be λµtp-terms, then: The above proposition implies that Parigot's λµ is a correct implementation of λ C . Correctness of Parigot's λµ with respect to a modified reduction theory for C was already shown by de Groote (1994) . However, the reduction rules did not contain the abort steps. A way to account for these abort steps is presented in the paper's conclusion. The solution requires an extension of λµ. The relation between λµ and a modified reduction theory for C was also studied by Ong and Stewart (1997) .
COROLLARY 26. Parigot's λµ calculus is sound and complete with respect to λ C in the sense that the reductions of one calculus can be simulated by the other.
Related Work
The relation between Parigot's λµ and λ C has been investigated by de Groote (1994) who mainly considers the λµ structural rule but not renaming and simplification. In the paper's conclusion, renaming is related to a rule proposed by Barbanera and Berardi (1993) . As for λ C , he only considers C L and C tp . However, these rules are not the original rules of Felleisen, since they do not contain A. For example, C tp is CM → C(λk.M (λf.k f )) which is in fact a reduction rule for λ F (Felleisen, 1988) . This work fails in relating λµ to λ C in an untyped framework, since it does not express continuations as abortive functions. It says in fact that F behaves as C in the simply-typed case. A proposal for modeling the abort steps is presented in the paper's conclusion.
Ong and Stewart (1997) also do not consider the abort step in Felleisen's rules. This could be justified because in a simply-typed setting these steps are of type ⊥ → ⊥. Therefore, it seems we have a mismatch. While the aborts are essential in the reduction semantics, they are irrelevant in the corresponding proof. We are the first to provide a proof theoretic justification for those abort steps, they correspond to the step ⊥ →⊥ ⊥.
Our presentation of classical natural deduction with one conclusion is similar to de Groote's presentation of λµ using intuitionistic sequents (de Groote, 1998) . Instead of distinguishing between ⊥ and ⊥ ⊥, de Groote introduces a new kind of negation written as A ⊥ . As in our case, there are two kinds of hypothesis: the regular hypothesis which correspond to the λ-bound variables and the hypothesis of the form A ⊥ which correspond to the continuation variables. The difference with our system is that the invocation of a continuation variable does not force one to perform a weakening step.
In addition to Ong and Stewart, Py (1998) , de Groote (1998) and Bierman (1998) pointed out the peculiarity of having an open λµ term corresponding to a tautology. Their solution is to abolish the distinction between commands and terms. A command is a term returning ⊥. The body of a µ-abstraction is not restricted to a command, but can be of the form µα.t, where t is of type ⊥. Thus, we have λy.µα.(y λx.
[α]x) : ¬¬A → A. We would then represent the term C(λk.(kI)x) (where I is λx.x) as µα. ([α]I) x. Whereas C(λk.kIx) would reduce to C(λk.kI) according to λ nC and to I in λµ n tp, it would be in normal form in their calculus. Thus, their work in relating λµ to λ C only applies to typed λ C , whereas our work also applies to the untyped case. Crolard (1999) studied the relation between Parigot's λµ and a calculus with a catch and throw mechanism. He showed that contraction corresponds to the catch operator (µα.
[α]t = catch α t) and weakening corresponds to the throw operator (µδ.
[α]t = throw α t for δ not free in t). He only considers terms of the form µα.
[α]t and µβ.
[α]t, where β does not occur free in t. This property is not preserved by the renaming rule, therefore reduction is restricted. We do not require such restrictions on reduction. We can simulate Ong and Stewart's λµ and Crolard's calculus via this simple translation: µα.t becomes µα.
[tp]t and [β]t becomes µδ.
[β]t, where δ is not free in t.
A categorical semantics of the call-by-name and call-by-value versions of Parigot's λµ-calculus extended with disjunction have been provided by Selinger (2001) . Our analysis of the logical strengths of EFQ, PL (or EM), and DN has led naturally to a restricted form of classical logic called minimal classical logic. Depending on whether EFQ, PL, or both are assumed in minimal logic, we get intuitionistic, minimal classical, or classical logic. Depending on whether we admit RAA ⊥ ⊥ and ⊥ e in full classical natural deduction (on top of minimal natural deduction), we get the correspondences with the λ-calculi considered in this paper, as summarized above. The calculus λ tp is the subset of λµtp in which expressions of the form µδ.
Conclusions
[α]t are only allowed when δ is not free in t and α is tp. The symbol EFQ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ stands for ⊥ e and Weakening. Among these systems, λ C -tp is a confluent extension of Felleisen's theory of control.
